In a release issued on December 16, 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) finalized several amendments to its executive compensation and corporate governance disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K.1 These changes are intended to improve several aspects of the disclosures provided to shareholders of public companies, and primarily concern the areas of risk, governance and director qualifications, and compensation, as follows:
The rules also move the requirement to disclose results of voting at shareholder meetings to Form 8-K from Forms 10-Q and 10-K, which will require results to be reported within four business days of a shareholder meeting. The rule amendments are discussed in greater detail below.
New Item 402(s) of Regulation S-K requires a company to describe its compensation policies and practices for all of its employees, including non-executive officers, if those compensation policies and practices create risks that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company. In response to comments on the proposed rules, the SEC changed the standard that would trigger disclosure from policies and practices that “may have a material effect on the company” to those that “are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company” [emphasis added]. The SEC intends the “reasonably likely” disclosure threshold for this purpose to be the same as that which is applied in the MD&A context, requiring risk-oriented disclosure of known material trends and uncertainties relating to the company as a whole. Another change from the proposed rules is that this disclosure will not be required within the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) section, but rather will form a separate narrative under the general compensation disclosure section of a company’s proxy statement (or in the Part III section of an Annual Report on Form 10-K).2
The SEC notes that these changes are intended to address the concern that the structure and application of incentive compensation policies have created, in certain situations, inadvertent incentives for management and non-executive employees that may lead to decisions that significantly increase the company’s risk and are inconsistent with the overall best interests of the company. For example, many believe that the short-term incentives created by the compensation structures in financial institutions encouraged disproportionate risk-taking, and contributed in some part to the global financial crisis that began in late 2008.
Item 402(s) contains a non-exclusive list of the following compensation policies and practices that may trigger disclosure:
If a company concludes that it does have compensation policies or practices that create risks that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company, the SEC has provided a non-exclusive list of issues that the company may need to address regarding its compensation policies or practices:
If a company concludes that its compensation policies and practices are not reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company, the rule does not require it to make an affirmative statement to that effect. This disclosure is not required to be provided by smaller reporting companies.
The SEC has revised the disclosure tables set forth in the Summary Compensation Table and the Director Compensation Table regarding stock awards and option awards to require disclosure of the aggregate grant date fair value of these awards in the year of grant. The fair value amount to be reported in the table would be computed in accordance with FASB ASC Topic 718 (“Stock Compensation;” formerly FASB Statement 123R). This disclosure replaces the current requirement to disclose the dollar amount recognized for financial statement reporting purposes for the fiscal year of these awards.
The SEC has made this change in response to investor concerns with the current Summary Compensation Table disclosure, and the belief that aggregate grant date fair value disclosure better reflects compensation committee decisions with regard to equity compensation grants. In addition, to facilitate year-to-year comparisons, this disclosure will be required to present recomputed disclosure for each preceding fiscal year required to be included in the table, so that the stock awards and option awards columns present the applicable full grant date fair values, and the total compensation column will also correspondingly be recomputed. The stock awards and option awards columns should be recomputed based on the individual award grant date fair values reported in the applicable year’s Grant of Plan-Based Awards Table, except that awards with performance conditions should be recomputed to report grant date fair value based on the probable outcome of the grant date, consistent with FASB ASC Topic 718, as further discussed below. In addition, if a person who would be a named executive officer for the most recent fiscal year (2009) also was disclosed as a named executive officer two years ago (2007) but not last year (2008), the named executive officer’s compensation for all three fiscal years must be reported pursuant to the amendments. However, companies are NOT required to include different named executive officers for any preceding fiscal year based on the recomputed total compensation amounts, or to amend any prior years’ Item 402 disclosure in any other filing. For smaller reporting companies that are only required to disclose the two most recent fiscal years, 2008 disclosure is not required to be added for an individual who first appears in the summary compensation table in 2009.
The SEC has also clarified that the grant date fair value disclosure relates to awards that are granted during an applicable fiscal year, as opposed to grants that are made for services rendered during the fiscal year, but where the awards are granted after the fiscal year has ended. However, the SEC also noted that companies should disclose such post-fiscal-year-end grants in their CD&A narratives, and should consider whether tabular disclosure of such awards should be included as a supplemental matter, particularly where the information would help in an understanding of the disclosure in their CD&As.
With respect to awards that are tied to a particular measure of performance (referred to as “performance awards”), the value of such awards must be computed based upon the probable outcome of the performance conditions as of the grant date. The SEC notes that such value “better reflects how compensation committees take performance-contingent vesting conditions into account in granting such awards.” This amount will be consistent with the company’s estimate of the compensation cost on the grant date to be recognized over the service period, excluding the effect of forfeitures. Companies will also be required to provide footnote disclosure in the Summary Compensation Table and the Director Compensation Table of the maximum potential value of a performance award, assuming that the highest level of performance associated with the award is probable.
The SEC changed its position from the proposing release with respect to the current requirements regarding reporting of the full grant date fair value of each equity award and decided not to rescind the requirement to report these amounts in the Grant of Plan-Based Awards Table and the Director Compensation Table. Therefore, these tables will continue to contain the same grant date fair value disclosures consistent with the prior rules, other than with respect to the change in computation for performance grants to align the disclosure requirement with current accounting rules.
The SEC has revised Item 401 of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of the particular experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that led a company’s board to conclude that each director and director nominee should serve as a director of the company, as of the time that the proxy statement is filed with the SEC. This disclosure will be required for all nominees and all directors, even those who are not standing for reelection at a particular meeting. Companies are not required to disclose specific experience, qualifications or skills for individual directors relating to committee service. However, if particular skills or attributes that are relevant to service on a specific committee form the basis for the reason that an individual was selected to serve on the board, then those skills or attributes should be identified in the disclosure.
This new disclosure requirement does not specify the particular information that should be disclosed about a nominee or director, and thus companies are free to describe their directors’ and nominees’ qualifications in any manner that they believe is responsive.
In addition, the SEC has expanded the disclosure that is required concerning directors’ and nominees’ other directorships of public companies. Instead of solely describing public company directorships held at the time of filing of the proxy statement, as had been the case under the prior rules, companies must now disclose any public company directorships held by their directors and nominees during the five years preceding the date of the filing, even if the director or nominee no longer serves on a particular board.
The SEC has also expanded the disclosure required regarding specified legal proceedings. Previously, directors, nominees, and executive officers were required by Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K to disclose legal proceedings in which they had been involved during the past five years. This disclosure has been expanded to capture legal proceedings occurring during the past 10 years. Additionally, the kinds of legal proceedings requiring disclosure have been expanded to include proceedings involving mail fraud, wire fraud or fraud involving any business entity; proceedings based on violations of securities, commodities, banking or insurance laws; and sanctions or orders imposed by a stock, commodities or derivatives exchange or other self-regulatory organization.
Lastly, in response to comments requesting the SEC to require expanded disclosure about board diversity, the SEC has adopted an amendment to Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of whether, and if so how, a board’s nominating committee considers issues of diversity in identifying nominees for director. The SEC deliberately did not define “diversity” for these purposes, noting that “some companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and national origin,” and that “for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity in ways that they consider appropriate.” If a nominating committee does have a policy with respect to consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, the company must disclose how the policy is implemented and how the committee, or the full board, assesses the effectiveness of the policy.
The SEC has also adopted amendments that will require companies to provide additional disclosure about the leadership structure of their boards of directors, and the role of their boards in the risk management process.
The SEC has revised Item 407 of Regulation S-K, and adopted a corresponding amendment to Item 7 of Schedule 14A, to require companies to explain why they believe that the board leadership structure they have chosen is the most appropriate structure as of the time of filing the disclosure. Companies are also required to disclose whether and why they have chosen to combine or separate the principal executive officer and board chair positions. Companies that have a single person serving as both principal executive officer and chairman of the board will be required to disclose whether and why they have a lead independent director, and describe the specific role played by the lead independent director in the leadership of the company. The additional disclosure is intended to provide investors with insights about why a company has chosen a particular leadership structure, and is also intended to increase transparency into how boards function.
Second, the SEC has adopted amendments that will require companies to provide additional disclosure about the board’s role in a company’s risk management process. The intended purpose of the additional disclosure is to provide investors with information about how a company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the board and senior management in managing the material risks facing the company. A key insight that may be provided by the disclosure is whether the board implements and manages its risk function through the board as a whole or through an audit committee or other standing committee, and whether and how the board or committee monitors risk.
Companies often engage compensation consultants to make recommendations on the appropriate levels of executive compensation, to design and implement incentive plans and policies, and to provide information on industry compensation practices. However, compensation consultants and their affiliates also provide additional services, such as benefits administration, human resources consulting, and actuarial services. Because the fees generated by these additional services may be greater than the fees for the executive compensation services, the SEC has raised a concern of a potential conflict of interest that may call into question the objectivity of the consultants’ executive pay recommendations. For example, in the SEC’s view, compensation consultants may face incentives to cater to management preferences in recommending executive compensation packages so that they may retain an engagement for additional services, providing larger fees. Investors have also raised similar concerns, arguing that the executive compensation services provided by compensation consultants may be influenced by the provision of additional services.
Prior to the revisions, Item 407 required companies to disclose the identity of a compensation consultant, indicate whether the consultant was engaged directly by the compensation committee of a board or by any other person, and disclose the nature and scope of the consultant’s assignment, and the material elements of the instructions or directions given to the consultant with respect to the performance of their duties. However, Item 407 did not previously require companies to disclose the fees paid to compensation consultants and their affiliates for executive compensation consulting or additional services. In order to address the concern for the potential conflict of interest in this area, the SEC has amended Item 407 to require disclosure, under specified circumstances, about the fees paid to compensation consultants and their affiliates when they take part in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive or director compensation and also provide additional services to the company, such as benefits administration, human resources consulting or actuarial services.
Under these rules:
The new rule does not require disclosure of the nature of the non-compensation-related services that are provided to a company by a compensation consultant. However, companies are free to provide such information if it would be helpful to investors in understanding the disclosure.
The new disclosure will not be required where the compensation consultant’s only additional roles are to consult on broad-based plans that do not discriminate, in scope, terms or operation, in favor of executive officers and directors, and that are generally available to all employees, such as 401(k) plans or certain health insurance plans; or to provide information that is not customized for the company or that is customized based on criteria that were not provided by the consultant.
The additional disclosure is intended to enable investors to assess any incentives a compensation consultant may have in recommending executive and director compensation and to better assess the compensation decisions made by the board. The new disclosure requirements are also intended to provide greater transparency in companies’ relationships with compensation consultants and alert investors to potential conflicts of interest in this area.
Under the new rules, companies will be required to disclose the results of voting at shareholder meetings in Form 8-Ks, rather than in Form 10-Qs and 10-Ks. The rules add a new Item 5.07 to Form 8-K, which requires companies to disclose results of a shareholder vote within four business days after the end of the meeting at which the vote was held.
The change is intended to provide investors with more timely information about the results of voting at meetings, as technological advances in shareholder communications and the use of third-party proxy services have increased the ability of companies to tabulate and disseminate vote results on a more expedited basis. The SEC recognized in the new rules that it may not be possible in all situations for companies to tabulate final voting results within the four-business-day window provided by the Form 8-K. Accordingly, the requirement is to report preliminary results of the votes within four business days, and to file an amended report on Form 8-K within four business days after the final results are known. However, if the final results are known within four business days after the end of the meeting, the final results should be reported on the original Form 8-K.
On December 22, 2009, the SEC issued guidance with regard to the transition to these new rules, which are effective on February 28, 2010.3 As noted in the interpretive guidance:
In response to these new rules, management and directors of public companies should consider the following questions, with a view to the disclosure that would flow from each answer, as companies prepare for the annual reporting season for fiscal 2009.
Endnotes
1 See SEC Release No. 33–9089; 34–61175; IC–29092; File No. S7–13–09, December 16, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf.
2 Note that the SEC stated in the release that under the current CD&A disclosure rules, to the extent that risk considerations are a material aspect of the company’s compensation policies or decisions for its named executive officers, the company is required to discuss them as part of the CD&A and will continue to be required to discuss them in the CD&A after the adoption of these amendments.
3 This interpretive guidance is available here: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/pdetinterp.htm.
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